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1. INTRODUCTION 
Argumentation is among the most powerful tools humanity has for building societies and 
solving problems. Argument stimulates deeper thought, motivates the search for more 
information, and at least in some cases produces alignment of belief. We learn through 
argumentation, both as individuals and societies. We also learn about argumentation, and as we 
learn about it, we change it profoundly. Argumentation in our day is technical not just in the 
content of some propositions or the qualifications of some participants but in the argument 
techniques that have evolved over millennia of practice.  
 Among the most visible of the evolutionary directions of argumentation are the 
increasingly disciplined bases for opinion-formation and the increasingly complex designs we 
have for incorporating disciplined opinion into decision making. This conference weighs one 
of those trends a bit more heavily than the other: focusing more on the growing dependence of 
citizens on experts than on the growing dependence of expertise itself on layers of technical 
achievements. However, both trends are important and need theoretical attention, and they are 
intimately interconnected. I am particularly pleased to be part of a conference that draws 
together such diverse disciplinary perspectives, because understanding the role of expertise in 
contemporary society is going to require all the disciplines with a piece of the problem to share 
their insights. 
 Despite disciplinary differences in which questions interest us most, what we all share 
as citizens is a need to make the best possible use of expertise, while reserving the possibility 
of holding experts accountable for their overall beneficence. Surveying the diversity of 
research topics at this conference suggests to me that it may be time to attempt a clean break 
from a notion that has had a powerful hold on rhetoric for centuries: the idea that appeal to 
authority is a class of arguments, some members of which are fallacious while others are 
sound. Contemporary argumentation studies inherited this notion, and it continues to drive a 
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search for a standard set of tests of acceptability of appeals to authority that can be applied 
within the natural limits of a critical discussion—for example, lists of critical questions that 
can be asked about an argument (Walton, 1989). Plenty of clear cases of argument from 
authority can be found, but so can plenty of cases where the same epistemic problems are 
expressed quite differently. Many contemporary practices involving dependence on expertise 
resist assimilation to the concept of an argument from authority or an appeal to expertise and 
are not illuminated by the critical questions approach. For example, there are system-level 
issues to consider, such as the overall quality of the information environment (at this 
conference, Shanahan and others) and its lack of aids to citizen judgment (at this conference, 
Anelli; Kloster; and others); institution-level issues, such as management of known sources of 
bias in deliberative inquiry (at this conference, Rehg; Snoeck-Henkemans & Wagemans; and 
others), and individual-level issues having to do with citizens’ capacity to judge information (at 
this conference, Pigliucci; Tachino & Russell; Weinel; and others) and with experts’ own 
attitudes toward their expertise (at this conference: Blair; Zenker; and others).  
 So let’s start with what any of us can see when we look around for expertise in play 
within variously scaled disagreement spaces. Unless we have already decided to restrict our 
attention to a certain class of arguments, the phenomena we see are quite heterogeneous. 
Consider an initial set of prototypes that will be familiar to everyone as settings where 
expertise is or may become a significant part of a disagreement space. 
 Prototype 1. Individual people purposefully searching for answers to questions, not 
knowing at first whether there are any experts in the subject. What they want is knowledge to 
guide their own actions and beliefs—not specifically an expert to trust. But questions about the 
expert basis for knowledge and about which experts may be trusted often come up when 
multiple sources have been found, and when the information sources do not all agree on the 
answer to the question. Most of us probably share the experience of searching the worldwide 
web for information on health either for ourselves or for family members. Some of us probably 
have family members who cherry-pick from among experts those whose advice happens to 
justify what they want to do and then appeal to these at need. In contemporary discourse, there 
is ample material that can be analyzed in terms of appeal to expert authority and ample 
opportunity to improve information literacy through critical questioning (from this conference, 
see McAfee; Nucci; and others). 
 Prototype 2. Individual people projecting their expertise, either because public 
information is their business or because they are hoping to build prestige, accumulate social 
capital, or attract jobs. Projection of expertise has become a small industry, supported by 
professional networking applications like LinkedIn and by more ambitious projects for 
mapping scientific expertise like Cornell’s VIVO project (see http://vivo.cornell.edu/). The 
growth of interest in professional networking suggests that the problem ordinary citizens face 
in choosing among experts is mirrored by the problem experts face in positioning themselves 
to be the ones chosen from among all possible sources of advice (see especially Tindale, this 
conference). 
 Prototype 3. Individual experts responding to questions of public interest. This pattern 
occurs daily in countless news stories, and it is well known that journalists choose sources for 
reasons that have little to do with actual expertise. Journalists often have favorite 
quotemeisters, and in the search for balanced coverage of controversies, they may select for 
diversity of opinion rather than for presenting the public with a good basis for forming its own 
opinions. 
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 Prototype 4. Panels of experts chartered to respond to requests for advice on specific 
points. Typically, this occurs as part of a larger deliberative process, with a subset of contested 
issues delegated to the experts while use of the answers is left to other participants such as 
policy makers or the public. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a theoretically 
and practically significant example (Rehg, 2011, and related remarks at this conference), but 
lower profile efforts of the same kind have become common in policy formation and have 
given rise to a new form of expertise in design of policy deliberation (Carcasson, this 
conference). 
 Prototype 5. Expert bureaucracies that actually make decisions and carry out actions. I 
have in mind here the myriad agencies that develop and enforce various standards, like the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, but also the many entities that make decisions about how 
to allocate research funds among possible research topics, like the National Science 
Foundation and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). For situations of this type, knowing 
who is and is not an expert is nowhere near sufficient to safeguard public interest. People who 
know what they are talking about may still overvalue their own interests over others’ interests, 
and people who have few checks on their behavior can take unfair advantage of that fact. The 
public has little to no say, for example, in how NIH allocates public funds among all of the 
diseases it might choose for funding.  
 I have arranged these prototypes along a continuum from the most ad hoc to the most 
institutionalized. All are important to understanding the role of expertise in what we believe 
and what we do. And to some extent, as we move up this ladder, the more institutional forms 
incorporate aspects of the ad hoc forms. For example, expert bureaucracies must have a steady 
supply of experts to perform specific judgmental tasks, including evaluation of the work of 
other experts. My own interest is increasingly focused on the more institutionalized end of this 
continuum, where questions about which individual experts to trust become less interesting and 
questions about institutional design become more interesting. 
 Notice that different disciplines involved in this conference have different strengths 
and weaknesses in dealing with the facets of the problem. Contemporary argumentation theory, 
especially pragma-dialectics, has greatly improved our understanding of how otherwise 
reasonable argument schemes may generate fallacious moves in discourse (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992; Snoeck-Henkemans & Wagemans, this conference). Normative 
pragmatics adds theorizing about the obligations inherent in different speech acts (Goodwin, 
2011 and this conference; Kauffeld, this conference). Informal logic suggests new ways of 
thinking about argument soundness (Johnson & Blair, 1994; Walton, 1989, 2008; represented 
at this conference by Blair; Tindale; and others). New directions in science studies offer 
powerful new concepts for thinking about varieties of expertise and about the meta-expertises 
required for how we live now (Collins & Evans, 2007; Collins & Weinel, 2011; Weinel, this 
conference). Other perspectives from communication, sociology, political science, and 
philosophy, too numerous and heterogeneous to cite, help us to understand institutions that 
emerge from practice and direct our attention to the integrity of our institutions and the 
problem-validity of their designs for making scientific knowledge actionable. 
 To the mix of perspectives that are already familiar in scholarship on expertise and 
expert-based arguments I will also add perspectives from design theory and from a newer line 
of work known as infrastructure studies. No amount of scientific literacy among the citizenry 
can eliminate the need for designing participation formats, so design theory is needed to guide 
how society takes advantage of expert knowledge. And particularly for the expressions of 
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expert dependence that move up the ladder toward institutionalization, it may be helpful for us 
to think of certain products and practices as infrastructural. 
2. ARGUMENTATION DESIGN THEORY 
To address argumentation as it now occurs rather than as it once occurred requires that we 
acknowledge the role of design—and acknowledge as well the fact that design has changed the 
practice of argumentation over time. Argumentation design theory is not one cohesive strand of 
work but a set of design concepts and design practices that are implicit in many distinct strands 
of work. Design themes have been central to my own work, much of which has been done in 
collaboration with Scott Jacobs. 
 Jacobs’ and my work is grounded in the natural design of conversational argument 
(Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs & Jackson, 1989, 1992), and it recognizes a blurry and 
reflexive distinction between natural and built environments for argumentation (Jackson, 1998, 
2008; Jackson & Jacobs, 2006). Most of our studies have been qualitative empirical discourse 
analyses, but with a strong theme around attempting to theorize design. I have proposed an 
explicit design methodology that could provide a framework for a version of translational work 
in our field (Jackson, 1998). 
 The natural design of argumentation in conversation is expansion around 
disagreement. In the normal course of conversation, argument starts with the participants 
becoming aware that they have a disagreement that makes some sort of difference to one or the 
other of them. Instead of moving forward with the business at hand, the participants reorganize 
their efforts around exploring and repairing the disagreement. They do this with varying levels 
of skill and with varying degrees of emotion. 
 Jackson and Jacobs have advanced three key propositions concerning the natural 
design of argumentation. 
 First, argumentation is about drilling down from disagreements, not building up from 
agreements. People do begin interactions with considerable bodies of common belief, but they 
do not and cannot enumerate these as the foundations from which to reach further agreements. 
Instead, people assume alignment until actions give evidence of misalignment. 
 Second, unless the misalignment is of no significance to anyone, it expands a speech 
act exchange by routing conversation into an attempt at repair. In ordinary conversation, the 
resolution process is commonly just more conversation. If the misalignment can be repaired, 
the conversation can return to its main business. 
 Third, sometimes, no resolution is possible within the natural limits of the 
conversation, and each new expansion simply exposes new disagreement space. Any 
conversational move provides some set of opportunities for disagreement, including not only 
what is actually asserted but also any belief or commitment the speaker reveals without 
actually stating it. Appeals to expert authority do not typically appear without context; they 
appear, as most argument content does, through challenge and response. 
 Argument expands around points of disagreement that the participants themselves 
choose from a constantly reshaping disagreement space. Sometimes participants accept 
standpoints simply because their co-participants have expressed commitment to these 
standpoints; other times they question the standpoint, but accept the thinnest possible backing; 
and other times, they attempt more extensive inquiry. Some have interpreted Grice’s (1989) 
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Cooperative Principle as implying that without this willingness to accept a great deal of content 
simply on one another’s say-so, conversation would be impossible. 
 So far I have been reviewing what we know about the natural design of argumentation 
and have said nothing about the problems presented by appeals to technical expertise. An 
appeal to expert authority occurring in ordinary conversation may look very much like the 
pattern familiar from informal logic texts: challenged for the basis for some exposed belief, a 
person may point to any form of support, including support from outside sources of all kinds. 
Sometimes the fact that authority can be cited for a standpoint is sufficient to end a line of 
argument. If not, asking critical questions about whether the outside source is truly 
authoritative is just one way to expand further. Another obvious way to expand the 
disagreement is for the challenger to demand to know how the outside source came to its 
conclusion, and yet another is to insist on referring the disagreement to someone outside the 
discussion itself. When we think about argument as a process of drilling down from 
disagreements, it is the challenger who must make some strategic calculation about how the 
discussion proceeds: whether to accept the authority’s standpoint, or to challenge the 
credentials of that authority, or to introduce a competing authority, or to explore the expert 
basis for the authority’s standpoint, or even to literally outsource the decision. These are 
various ways the sequence can unfold, not fundamentally different ways of reaching 
conclusions (and as Zenker pointed out at this conference, the challenger’s choice among these 
alternatives may be based on calculation of which offers the greatest strategic advantage). 
 I want to extend these key propositions with a fourth: there is no limit in principle to 
how deep participants can go in drilling down from disagreement. But there are limits in 
practice, and participants sometimes find that it is simply not feasible to continue with ever 
more fundamental objections. And moreover, sometimes we make judgments about how likely 
it is that drilling down further will produce anything useful. This characteristic of natural 
argument is inherited by technical argumentation and by argumentation among experts 
themselves. 
 My task now is to show how these key findings about the natural design of 
argumentation might help us in thinking about technical argumentation and its role in practical 
affairs of citizens. In the US, we have an ongoing controversy over how schools should 
educate young teenagers about sex. Ideologically based, the main division of opinion is 
between those who believe that young people should be taught to abstain from sex until 
marriage and those who believe that young people should be taught to practice safer sex 
throughout their lives. This is a very complex controversy, one that has played out between 
parents and school officials in countless school districts as well as between politicians and 
public health agencies. A large empirical research literature has built around this controversy, 
and it is available for invocation by participants.  
 Figure 1 presents a partial concept map of some of the issues in the controversy as it 
had developed by late 2007. This is not an argument diagram but an abstraction from many 
individual arguments to a set of themes that connect to one another in various ways, such as 
support versus opposition. Whether any of these particular themes appear in any text or in any 
bounded discussion of sex education depends on what opinions participants have going in to 
the discussion and how they choose to expand from any disagreements that appear. The 
materials that are available for invocation from participants include artifacts remaining from 
earlier contributions. In the lower right hand corner my concept map shows just one of many 
such artifacts: a research report published in BMJ and widely covered in the popular press 
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(Underhill, Montgomery, & Operario, 2007). Most citizens who encountered this artifact saw it 
mentioned in the news, in stories announcing that abstinence-only sex education does not 
work, or in quasi-official websites with information on sex education programs. 
 In my own prior analysis of this controversy (Jackson, 2008), I suggested that expert 
arguments enter public debate as “black boxes” that are not really open to expansion without 
assistance of experts. In actor-network theory (from which I have borrowed this concept), a 
black box is a stabilized practice that has ceased to require explanation and defence within an 
expert community (Latour, 1987). An ordinary educated citizen can make a few inroads into 
evaluating the contents of the box, but to go very far the explorer will have to actually build 
expertise. Sooner or later, without specialty expertise, argument drills down to something that 
must be taken on expert authority. 
 
Fig. 1. Partial concept map of abstinence-only sex education controversy. 
Consider the plight of the intrepid school board member who wants to understand how 
scientists could possibly conclude that abstinence education does not work—for it is the citizen 
who disagrees with this conclusion who is most likely to want to find its flaws. This intrepid 
soul can find the Underhill et al. (2007) article without much difficulty, since it has been 
mentioned in the news. With only the ubiquitous expertise of a literate adult, the citizen can 
identify a first level of backing for the conclusion: something like Figure 2 from the original 
article, reproduced below, showing a summary of all identifiable studies comparing 
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abstinence-only sex education to “usual care” (whatever curriculum the school district had in 
place prior to introduction of a curriculum designed to teach abstinence from sex outside of 
marriage). 
 
Fig. 2. Summary of evidence from Underhill et al. (2007). 
Anyone who is not too easily discouraged can see that the study-by-study evidence divides 
unevenly between results that show abstinence programs more effective than the comparison 
and results that show abstinence programs less effective. More expertise is needed to avoid 
faulty reasoning at this level: sociological discrimination is required to understand that this 
pattern of findings is, overall, strong evidence against the success of abstinence programs 
judged against the outcomes measured in the studies, and that it is not evidence of scientific 
controversy (Weinel, this conference). Additional skeptical questions can be asked at this level. 
One might suspect, for example, that the authors of the study selected evidence in a biased way 
to support their own preferred conclusion; but to make any reasonable judgment about this 
question the individual must understand not only systematic review but also certain standard 
criteria scientists use to judge experimental design. If the individual is satisfied that the authors 
selected studies in an unbiased way and that the evident heterogeneity in the body of studies 
can still yield a consistent picture, a next recourse is to consider whether the individual studies 
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have been fairly and correctly categorized, and this requires still more expertise, most 
particularly in statistics. Few citizens who are not themselves social scientists could get this 
far, but for those who reach this point and find nothing to object to, there are still avenues for 
critique. For example, before giving up entirely on the idea of abstinence education, one might 
want to examine the actual curriculum materials used in the individual studies to make 
qualitative judgments based on knowledge of child psychology, instructional design, or 
persuasive message design, all of which are themselves expert fields. 
 Among our natural argumentation competencies are some that allow us to invent 
improvements that extend these competencies, and these extended competencies become 
naturalized competencies for new members of a discourse community. Black boxes assemble 
these inventions into repeatable patterns of argumentation within expert communities. Black 
boxes develop through long experience within a substantive domain, and they become stable 
features of expert practice when experts themselves come to regard them as the usual way to 
draw a conclusion. Scientists appropriate these practices from other fields and build new 
practices of their own on top of the prior practice. So in the case of research on sex education, 
for example, methods for judging the effectiveness of educational programs are built on a pre-
existing set of procedures for measuring outcomes and comparing them statistically. Methods 
for systematically reviewing literatures are built over methods for generating large numbers of 
studies that answer variations on a single central question. 
 For citizens, this means that expert knowledge introduced into practical discussion or 
policy making is likely to have its actual substantive basis in a very large number of very 
different expert fields. Any effort to engage substantively involves digging down through 
layers of expertise. And at each layer, much of the substantive basis for conclusions has been 
left implicit because expert practice at that level has long since been black-boxed. 
 How should we think about these layers of specialty knowledge? Set aside the 
question of whether to trust individual scientists. Can we really trust knowledge claims that 
come wrapped in layers and layers of prior decisions about how to draw conclusions? Every 
one of those layers involves some substantive content, but also some historical decision by one 
person or group to accept a way of doing things based on the expert guidance of some other 
person or group, and these historical decisions introduce path-dependence into a current array 
of decisions. 
 Although concepts and methods familiar in argumentation studies have much to 
contribute within layers, and something to contribute between layers, I suggest that theorizing 
about layering as a characteristic of contemporary argumentation practice requires some new 
concepts and methods. It is this notion that leads me to suggest that we look to infrastructure 
studies for ideas about how to theorize our heavily layered practices and about how to design 
better interfaces between one layer and another. 
3. INFRASTRUCTURE THEORY 
Does it make sense to talk about expert organizations and institutions as infrastructure for 
decision making? I think it does. At first, it may be very difficult to see where I am heading in 
this discussion of infrastructure theory. It will help to remember that I am arguing that 
argumentation itself has evolved many technical systems with device-like components. And it 
may also help if I say up front that the natural competence we all have for arguing is connected 
to these technical systems in the same way that people’s natural ability to walk is connected to 
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technical systems that aid in transportation and the way people’s natural ability to talk is 
connected to technical systems for telecommunication. Technical systems do not usually 
replace natural competencies, but they do often change our options for how to do things.   
 The formal study of infrastructure is very new. The concept itself is really a twentieth-
century concept, and scholarly interest in infrastructure has been rising since about the 1980s, 
with studies of large technical systems. Much of the work in infrastructure studies involves 
analysis of the evolution of particular systems, such as emergence of the power distribution 
infrastructure (Hughes, 1983). Lately, though, general theory has been emerging of what it is to 
be infrastructural, and it is also increasingly understood that skills and competencies can be 
infrastructural (Bietz, Baumer, & Lee, 2010). 
 An increasingly standard account of what makes a technical system infrastructural is 
that offered by Star and Ruhleder (1996), based on the observation that infrastructure is not a 
category of technical systems but a kind of relationship between a technical system and the 
work it supports. Systems are infrastructure for particular users or uses when they are 
embedded in (“sunk into”) some practice, when they operate transparently and 
unproblematically, when they have extension in time and space beyond any one occasion of 
use, and when their use is “naturalized” in the learning of a practice built over them. They 
depend on standards (so as to interoperate with other systems), are built on the installed base of 
other and earlier infrastructure, and become visible when they “break.” 
 Technical systems that become infrastructural for a set of users are those that can be 
taken for granted, incorporated as layers beneath other technical systems. The more 
infrastructural they become, the less visible they become to the user. Highway systems and 
electricity distribution systems are infrastructural for contemporary, developed economies, 
allowing individuals and communities to build other services that take these systems for 
granted.  
 As Edwards, Bowker, Jackson, and Williams (2009) point out, infrastructures cannot 
just be designed and built; they must grow, becoming infrastructural not as a matter of prior 
engineering but as a matter of incorporation into work. For a technical system, becoming 
infrastructure is an achievement that occurs slowly over time if it occurs at all (S. J. Jackson, 
Edwards, Bowker, & Knobel, 2007). Not all efforts to build infrastructure have been 
successful. Some have simply failed to attract users (Star & Ruhleder, 1996) and others have 
failed to achieve “can’t-do-withoutness” (Edwards et al., 2009).  
 Technical systems are infrastructural for people who take them for granted and 
construct other activities that assume the technical capabilities as facts about the environment. 
A technical system may be considered infrastructure when its capabilities have been embedded 
so deeply in work that the work cannot continue if the technical capability fails, and especially 
when learning to do the work includes learning to rely on the technical system as though it 
were a natural fact. 
 A key insight of Star and Ruhleder (1996; also Bowker, Baker, Millerand, & Ribes, 
2010, and others working in infrastructure studies) is that infrastructure must be understood 
relationally. A system is not born infrastructural; that status is earned slowly, as people take 
advantage of a system capability to create other layers of function over that capability. 
 One feature absent from prior accounts of infrastructure is recognition of the moral 
responsibilities that grow along with infrastructure. People who build and maintain technical 
systems do not necessarily envision the level of responsibility that might follow from other 
people coming to depend on the system. But as a technical system becomes embedded in 
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people’s work and daily lives, and as other systems and associated practices are built over 
them, a generalized duty of care begins to build as the system becomes more infrastructural. A 
system builder may not have had any ambition to become so essential to others’ welfare, but 
once people come to depend on a system, responsibility for beneficence begins to attach to 
everyone who has a hand in the system. 
 For the study of how the public comes to depend on scientific expertise, much can be 
learned from infrastructure studies. The first and most important lesson is that, pervasively in 
contemporary human society, systems and associated practices are built over other systems and 
their associated practices, without necessarily any explicit attention to the terms under which 
this occurs. Explicit agreements about who is responsible for what tend to emerge late in the 
process of infrastructuring. First comes dependency of one system on another, then comes 
recognition that one system is vulnerable to failure in the other, and only then comes a desire 
for assurances that the embedded system will not be allowed to fail. 
 A second lesson is that social responsibility and duty of care are not elements of a job 
description, but obligations that follow automatically with how much consequence one 
person’s actions may have for another’s well-being. Building a bridge connected to a highway 
obligates someone (a government, usually) to see to the continued safety of the structure. 
 A third lesson is that infrastructuring occurs when trust is invested in a technical 
system, including in a system that is not (at first) worthy of trust. We put trust in physical 
infrastructures and build other technical systems over them even though we know that the 
infrastructure may fail. Often, the fact that other technical systems have been layered over a 
prospective infrastructure speeds the hardening of that system into something truly 
dependable—by raising the stakes for failure of the system.  
 Now I believe we are prepared to test a conjecture: that many dilemmas of 
contemporary practice will benefit from thinking about how to make expert advice as 
infrastructural as possible—designing them for dependability and then just depending on them 
until they need our attention again. This will shift our focus from evaluating individual experts 
or individual contributions of expert advice toward actively designing devices that organize 
scientific and technical knowledge for use. 
4. THE L’AQUILA EARTHQUAKE TRIAL 
As a context for testing my conjecture I have chosen events around a criminal trial that has 
been in progress since September 2011—the trial of seven scientists for alleged negligence 
prior to the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake (see “Scientists in the Dock,” 2011, for a good 
overview). If we wanted to choose one controversy as the focus of a cross-disciplinary multi-
perspectival study of expertise in public deliberation, we could hardly do better than the events 
surrounding the L’Aquila earthquake trial. This controversy demonstrates in the most tragic 
way what is at stake for both citizens and scientists when expertise is mismanaged. Depending 
on how we slice the events occurring before and after the earthquake, the case seems to fall 
right within the focal strength of any of several prominent lines of work. For pragma-
dialecticians, there are derailed strategic manoeuvres to be untangled; for social 
epistemologists, there are conflicting sources of expert advice to the citizenry and conflicting 
claims about the track records of expert methodologies; for Third Wave science studies, there 
are disputes over who should be participating in the decisions; for informal logicians, there is a 
trial involving heavily contested expert testimony. I will of course concentrate on what this 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF EXPERTS 
11 
case might teach us about design and infrastructuring—but by no means do I think that we can 
understand this complicated set of events without many other theoretical perspectives. 
 So to review the history, on April 6, 2009, a devastating earthquake killed 308 people 
in the Italian city of L’Aquila. For several months prior to the large quake, the area had been 
experiencing smaller tremors. A researcher at a nearby laboratory had predicted that a major 
quake would occur, based on unusual emissions of radon gas, and had been denounced by the 
local authorities. On March 31, 2009, civil authorities convened a panel of scientists in 
L’Aquila to evaluate the level of risk. Discussion at that meeting focused on the impossibility 
of accurately predicting when earthquakes will occur. Nevertheless, just one week before the 
quake, public officials reassured the people in the region that there was no special danger 
despite the ongoing swarm of smaller quakes. One official stated that, in fact, the swarm of 
smaller quakes was actually a good sign. He claimed to have gotten this opinion from “the 
experts.” Citizens who had been sleeping out of doors returned to their homes, and many died a 
week later as a result of that decision. 
 A little over a year after the quake, Italian prosecutors brought criminal charges of 
manslaughter against seven scientists (the meeting convenor Bernardo de Bernardinis and six 
experts in seismology), provoking a worldwide outcry by other scientists (Hall, 2011). The trial 
has been underway since September 2011, and the seven defendants made their first statements 
just two days before our conference opened. 
 Let us return to five prototype problems I mentioned earlier. In many controversies, 
all of these prototypes appear in a tangle, and this is especially noticeable in the events 
surrounding the L’Aquila earthquake. 
 Prototype 1. Individual citizens were alarmed by the swarm of small tremors and were 
highly motivated to seek out expert advice on whether to sleep outdoors. Two very different 
opinions were available to them: at one extreme, the highly alarmist opinion of Giampaolo 
Giuliani, who claimed to be able to predict that a large quake was imminent; and at the other 
extreme, the highly reassuring opinion of Bernardo de Bernardinis, who claimed that the small 
tremors were actually a favorable indication that there would be no large quake in the near 
future. Here citizens were forced to actually choose between sources claiming expertise. 
Neither, however, was himself a seismologist. Giuliani based his claims on his own 
observations, using a nonstandard method for prediction. De Bernardinis based his claims (so 
he said) on consultation with other scientists. 
 Prototypes 2 and 3. Active projection of expertise was at work as well, with Giuliani 
attempting to build his own credibility by explaining the nature of his experience and the novel 
basis of his prediction and other scientists attempting to discredit him. Journalists of course 
played their usual role, seeking out commentators on Giuliani’s predictions, both before and 
after the deadly quake. 
 Prototype 4. A now infamous hearing of the Major Risks Commission brought 
together six highly qualified experts for the specific purpose of determining whether the series 
of smaller quakes indicated elevated risk for L’Aquila and the surrounding region. The 
convening of an expert panel is the sort of thing that commonly happens when an expert 
community has not reached consensus on an issue and when much is at stake. There is now 
evidence (from a recorded telephone conversation) that the expert panel was convened for the 
specific purpose of squelching the alarmist message of Giampaolo Giuliani (Cartlidge, 2012; 
Nosengo, 2012), and that is in fact what happened as a result. Here we see the deep need for 
looking beyond questions of who may participate as an expert. There is no doubt whatsoever 
SALLY JACKSON 
12 
that the six earthquake scientists brought together at L’Aquila “knew what they were talking 
about,” but somehow they seem not to have known what to say to the people of L’Aquila 
before, during, or after the meeting (Hall, 2011). 
 Prototype 5. The scientists assembled at L’Aquila were not random choices from the 
expert community but members of the Major Risks Commission, an institutionalized 
component of the national public safety bureaucracy. They were also members of global 
research communities whose research topics and methods carry institutional history of all 
kinds, ranging from path-dependent scientific modeling techniques to the highly contingent 
professional values that defend boundaries between scientific knowledge and the sociopolitical 
uses of that knowledge. Public officials had a legitimate institutional interest in suppressing 
Giuliani’s message if they believed it to be scientifically invalid; allowing his alarmist message 
to be spread without countering it risked losing the public’s confidence in the public agencies 
responsible for risk information. 
 Later it may be possible to do much more with this tragic and complicated case, but a 
few observations are possible even now.  
 First, in circumstances like this, citizens cannot take individual responsibility for 
evaluating competing expert claims. They must delegate this work. There was a formally 
composed body whose remit was to do this work. The meeting convened to do this work had 
an appropriate and usually reliable design: a consultation with a panel of the most highly 
qualified scientists available. Other experts reviewing the transcript of the meeting have 
affirmed the scientific correctness of statements made by the participants, especially on the 
impossibility of accurately forecasting earthquakes. However, this normally reliable device 
was invoked not by mutual agreement among participants, but as a coercive move by 
government officials who already knew what answer they hoped to get from the inquiry and 
who had also already tried other methods of repressing Giuliani’s alarmist message. The 
meeting lasted less than an hour. 
 Significantly, what came out of the meeting was a statement to the press by a 
nonspecialist rather than a formal statement authored by the specialists (Nosengo, 2010). 
Whenever one technical system must interact with another, the interface becomes important. 
There were opportunities for compromise and distortion at multiple points in the process of 
consulting the scientists about the danger of a major earthquake, and this was most evident in 
the interface between the panel of earthquake scientists and the press. 
 Second, an integral part of the controversy has been who should and who should not 
be contributing to decision making in virtue of their expertise, but in addition to the ground-
level dispute over participants’ legitimacy, there are undisputed experts involving themselves 
on issues beyond their expertise. 
 Consider Giampaolo Giuliani first. He is not a seismologist, but he is a working 
scientist who holds a patent on a device for measuring radon emissions and had been working 
on the use of his predictive technique for some time. Authorities attempted to suppress his 
contributions (Sample, 2009), referring to him as a scaremonger and even (indirectly) as an 
imbecile (Cartlidge, 2012). However, the idea of predicting earthquakes from gas emissions is 
not in itself implausible, and Giuliani believed that his own investigations were validating his 
methods. One might say that Giuliani is in the “should not contribute” category, because his 
ideas had been considered and rejected by the relevant experts, specifically by those who later 
played a part in the L’Aquila meeting of the Major Risks Commission (Dollar, 2010). But 
remember that Giuliani was working on a new method based on this idea. A person’s 
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participation in decision making cannot be dependent on employment of techniques that are 
already blackboxed; blackboxing is something that occurs after multiple successful uses of a 
technique, not something achieved in advance of successful use. 
 Next consider Bernardo de Bernardinis. He also is a scientist but not an expert in 
earthquakes. He convened the March 31 hearing, and he gave statements to the press on behalf 
of the Commission. The gist of his statement was that the swarm of small tremors did not 
indicate any elevated risk of a large quake, and that in fact the swarm of small tremors was a 
favorable sign. A transcript of the hearing was published in an Italian magazine, and most 
capable readers find that the co-defendant scientists were scientifically correct in their 
discussion, saying nothing that would have justified de Bernardinis in this conclusion (Jordan, 
2011; Nosengo, 2010). Based on a recorded telephone message disclosed during the trial, it 
appears that de Bernardinis was instructed to convene the hearing with the specific purpose of 
finding a basis for reassuring the citizens (Nosengo & Nature News Blog, 2012), and he may 
well have felt that his idea was confirmed by the specialists’ review of the situation. His six 
colleagues undoubtedly knew that what de Bernardinis said was false and dangerous; that is, 
they undoubtedly knew that people should remain vigilant. But they did not contradict de 
Bernardinis, then or later. The members of the Major Risks Commission definitely belong in 
the “should contribute” category, but what now becomes apparent is that what people should 
contribute is more important than which people should contribute. 
 I will not discuss the contributions of the other six defendants in the trial. Each of 
them made their first appearance in court as I prepared these remarks. But let us consider, 
finally, the participation of the broader scientific community, especially after the 
announcement that the seven commission members would be indicted and tried for 
manslaughter. About the immediate protest from within the scientific community, it should be 
noted that geophysicists and other scientists are no better positioned than any other citizen to 
judge charges of negligent conduct, if these are not based on the quality of the science but on 
the performance of a public duty. Among the range of possible bases for a charge of 
negligence would be focusing on issues peripheral to the assessment of risk, collaborating in a 
sham proceeding with a predetermined outcome, allowing a spokesperson to misrepresent the 
scientific conclusions, or simply failing to anticipate public response to an overly reassuring 
message. Any of these, if they occurred, would fail ethical standards such as those suggested 
by Hardwig (1994), but whether these failures occurred, and whether their occurrence 
constitutes criminal conduct, is clearly not a scientific question that can be decided by other 
scientists. 
 The third and most important element of this case is what it reveals about the 
importance of accountability for anything the public is expected to treat as infrastructure. From 
the perspective of infrastructure theory, earthquake measurement and monitoring make up an 
infrastructure-in-waiting. These activities are already highly standardized, and they are 
invisible to the public except as reports of how powerful a given tremor was. But these 
capabilities have not yet achieved infrastructure status because people have not quite figured 
out what to do with them. A technical system becomes infrastructural when practices are built 
on top of it, and what can be built on top of earthquake science is still a source of tension 
between citizens and scientists. Despite scientists’ widespread agreement that earthquakes 
cannot be accurately predicted, citizens want and expect predictions of when and where 
earthquakes will occur. This may never be successful, but it is certainly the case that people 
will continue searching for ways to predict earthquakes. Scientists themselves envision a 
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different infrastructural use of earthquake science: as a justification for construction standards 
that make earthquakes survivable. Unfortunately, public officials and citizens alike are far 
more interested in earthquake warnings than in long-term investment in safer buildings, a point 
that some scientists have made about L’Aquila (Hall, 2011; “Science in the Dock,” 2011). 
 Before this or any other variety of expertise can become infrastructural, someone must 
accept the duty of care that comes from building something that others build over. On this 
point, I want to examine two formal statements issued by scientific organizations, one issued 
by the American Geophysical Union and another written by Alan Leshner on behalf of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. These statements trouble me, because 
they not only fail to acknowledge the expert community’s duty of care but actively reject it for 
scientists engaged in important public decisions. Specifically the two statements suggest that 
scientists may refuse to share their expertise unless they themselves are held harmless: 
The criminal charges against these scientists and officials are unfounded. Despite decades of 
scientific research in Italy and in the rest of the world, it is not yet possible to accurately and 
consistently predict the timing, location, and magnitude of earthquakes before they occur. It is thus 
incorrect to assume that the L’Aquila earthquake should have been predicted. The charges may also 
harm international efforts to understand natural disasters and mitigate associated risk, because risk 
of litigation will discourage scientists and officials from advising their government or even working 
in the field of seismology and seismic risk assessment. (Anonymous, 2010, italics mine) 
 Years of research, much of it conducted by distinguished seismologists in your own country, 
have demonstrated that there is no accepted scientific method for earthquake prediction that can be 
reliably used to warn citizens of an impending disaster. To expect more of science at this time is 
unreasonable. It is manifestly unfair for scientists to be criminally charged for failing to act on 
information that the international scientific community would consider inadequate for issuing a 
warning. Moreover, we worry that subjecting scientists to criminal charges for adhering to 
accepted scientific practices may have a chilling effect on researchers, thereby impeding the free 
exchange of ideas necessary for progress in science and discouraging them from participation in 
matters of great public importance. (Leshner, 2010, italics mine) 
At issue is whether de Bernardinis and the six earthquake scientists exercised the due diligence 
demanded by the situation. Until the trial is concluded, no one is really in a very good position 
to say whether anyone failed in their duty of care for the citizenry. However, for citizens to 
depend on expert communities in decision making, representatives of those expert 
communities must be accountable for performance failures, just as any infrastructural system 
includes accountability for individuals who build and operate the infrastructure. The Major 
Risks Commission clearly had a duty of care with respect to the citizens of L’Aquila, and the 
criminal trial is about whether this duty was shirked when scientific opinion about the 
predictability of earthquakes was invoked as support for public misinformation—the reassuring 
official statement that the small tremors were a favorable sign rather than a cause for continued 
vigilance. As Hardwig (1994) observed, the public depends on experts to blow the whistle in 
cases like this one. 
 My point here agrees with Douglas (2003), who argues that scientific practice is 
subject to the same moral responsibilities as apply to any other social action: the responsibility 
to consider and weigh risk associated with one’s own choices, and especially with the 
unintended consequences of one’s own choices. Scientists who take actions without thinking 
through potential consequences may create harm through negligence, regardless of whatever 
scientific purpose may be served by the action. While Douglas’s argument is focused on choice 
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of scientific programs rather than on advice-giving, her position that scientists must accept that 
there can be negligence in their performance as scientists is potentially relevant to this case. 
5. CONCLUSION 
How scholars deal with the theoretical problems of understanding expertise will naturally 
affect (and be affected by) how the public deals with the practical problems of evaluating 
expert opinion. Especially throughout the later half of the 20th Century, citizen groups and 
government agencies have been tinkering with designs for tapping into our vast stores of 
expertise. But the design process has been guided by trial-and-error more than by theory. What 
might a well-developed argumentation design theory offer?  
 First let me clarify what I mean by design theory. Whatever its specific content, the 
theory should be capable of supporting design, including proposals for novel designs. 
Reasoning from analogy with other design enterprises, we should expect that each unique 
controversy may have unique design requirements—as do unique building sites. Design 
disciplines have general principles and models of how these principles apply in particular 
settings, but they assume that any new situation will require its own design based on 
application of the principles and inspired by the successful models of the past. The 
characteristics of the controversy should shape the design of a deliberation process the way a 
building site shapes the design of the structure. The role of theory is to suggest design 
hypotheses that get implemented as actual designs for the conduct of argumentation. 
 Argumentation design theory will likely draw content from many sources, the most 
obvious of which are normative theories of argumentation (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993). I have suggested in these remarks that certain design theory 
problems may also benefit from what we know about other layered technical systems—that is, 
from what we know about infrastructure. There is infrastructural potential in society’s 
scientific and technical capacity, but infrastructure isn’t infrastructure until its operation can be 
taken for granted and other activities can be confidently built over it. Good designs for 
exploitation of technical expertise must let the details of expert judgment sink into invisibility 
as far as the ordinary citizen is concerned, but both the basis for expert judgment and its social 
consequences must become a matter of great care for those who work inside the technical 
system. In other words, instead of focusing circumstantially on whether and when it is 
reasonable to place confidence in technical experts, argumentation design theory focuses on 
how to design trustworthiness into relationships between technical experts and citizens. 
 How, exactly, does trustworthiness get designed into a system? Turning again to 
comparison with infrastructural systems, a key feature is an acknowledged duty of care. People 
in the infrastructure business have an inescapable duty of care for those who depend on them. 
Scientific fields must embrace this duty of care, and while it is possible that what is happening 
in L’Aquila will discourage scientists from giving advice, it is also possible that individual 
scientists who engage with public controversy will grow accustomed to accepting the same 
kinds of personal risk that public officials do.  
 Our ability to rationally manage our dependence on technical expertise is vulnerable 
in many ways, but among these, one of the most serious vulnerabilities is the notion that 
experts themselves should have no accountability for the foreseeable consequences of how 
they deploy their expertise. But accountability, like other aspects of a sociotechnical system, 
must be designed with care to achieve intended effects (trust) without unwanted effects 
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(suppression of experts’ participation in practical affairs). Accountability may take much less 
drastic forms than criminal prosecution, and it can incorporate protection for those acting in 
good faith. The worldwide scientific community has been shocked by the criminal prosecution 
of these Italian scientists. But this extreme method of calling the experts to account was only 
attractive because of the absence of any well-proportioned method of doing so.  
 From an infrastructure theory perspective, the task we face is not deciding whether to 
trust experts or which experts to trust, but to recognize that expertise is a societal investment 
that can be shaped for greater trustworthiness. Professional training can be infused with ethical 
principles (Hardwig, 1994) and with analytic frameworks for considering broader social 
impacts (Cohen, 2012). Accountability structures can be devised for more institutionalized 
forms of expert participation. Procedural checks and balances can be incorporated to control 
for known sources of bias. And other strategies are of course possible. Since we must depend 
on experts, we must make it as safe as possible to do so. 
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